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Abstract:  
A long tradition in economics explores the association between the quality of formal 
institutions and economic performance. The literature on the relationship between such 
institutions and happiness is, however, rather limited, and inconclusive. In this paper, 
we revisit the findings from recent cross-country studies on the institutions-happiness 
association. Our findings suggest that their conclusions are qualitatively rather 
insensitive to the specific measure of ‘happiness’ used, while the associations between 
formal institutions and subjective well-being differ among poor and rich countries. 
Separating different types of institutional quality, we find that in developing countries 
the effects of economic-judicial institutions on happiness dominate those of political 
institutions, while analyses restricted to middle- and high-income countries show strong 
support for an additional beneficial effect of political institutions. Our results bear 
important implications which we discuss in the concluding section of the paper. 
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1. Introduction 
Since the study of subjective well-being gained wider interest in the early nineties in 
both academia and among the public, much multi-disciplinary work, in particular in 
psychology and economics, has furthered our understanding of the sources of happiness, 
life satisfaction and other embodiments of subjective well-being.1  
In this paper, we study to what extent formal national institutions affect people’s 
happiness, which is one of the main questions in this literature. Institutions, broadly 
defined by North (1990) as ‘the rules of the game’, regulate public and private affairs 
and could thus be expected to exert an important influence on individual well-being. For 
example, well-functioning legal systems provide and enforce property rights, insuring 
citizens against violence, theft and economic exploitation, while democratic institutions 
and government decentralization provide everyone with the means to influence the 
political process and resulting policy outcomes (Frey and Stutzer, 2000a; Bjørnskov, 
Dreher and Fischer, 2008b). In political decision-making, the extent of democratic, 
institutional constraints on politics, but also the relative strength of political veto 
players, might be important.2  
At a more basic level, one would think that institutions affecting the degree of 
protection of life and property ought to clearly affect the happiness of entire populations 
                                               
1
 For an introduction into different concepts and measurements of subjective well-being, see Fischer 
(2009). 
2
 Indeed, the results of Henisz (2000, 2002) indicate that constraints on policy-making are associated with 
objectively better economic outcomes. A common argument is that most people are status-quo biased, 
while the presence of such constraints slows down the political reform process and prevents the ‘tyranny 
of the majority’, thus increasing the well-being of the average risk-averse individual (Alt and Lowry, 
1994; Tsebelis, 1995; König, 2001). 
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subject to the same rules and institutions. Good democratic institutions may also create 
additional ‘procedural utility’ – the outcome-independent benefit from active political 
involvement, which has been shown to substantially exceed the contribution of the pure 
allocation effect to well-being (Stutzer and Frey, 2003). 
Previous studies have investigated the effect of various measures and concepts of 
institutional quality on subjective well-being: democratic institutions and civil liberties, 
the quality of legal institutions and the rule of law, government effectiveness and 
economic freedom, the existence of various political constraints and subsidiarity in 
political decision-making (e.g., Frey and Stutzer, 2000a; Henisz, 2000; Helliwell, 2006; 
Ovaska and Takashima, 2006; Bjørnskov, Dreher and Fischer, 2008a; Dorn et al., 2007, 
2008; Helliwell and Huang, 2008; Blume, Müller and Voigt, 2009). These studies have 
come to inconclusive results. As such, a growing literature has yielded few insights not 
disputed by subsequent studies.3  
We ask what the reason for this lack of consensus may be. Previous papers may 
have come to different conclusions because they used different measures of happiness, 
different control variables, and different samples. In addition, different studies have 
used different institutional indicators that may or may not measure truly separate 
constructs (cf. Knack and Langbein, 2010). An additional problem with the previous 
                                               
3
 To illustrate, the effects of political rights on life satisfaction tend to vanish in samples focusing on the 
whole world when further country-level control variables are added (e.g., Schyns, 1998, Bjørnskov, 
Dreher and Fischer, 2008a). In sub-samples of developed countries only, however, the beneficial effects 
tend to prevail (Dorn et al., 2007; Helliwell and Huang, 2008). For more examples, a more detailed 
discussion of the literature, including transmission channels of institutions, and reasons why previous 
studies may have come to different results, we refer to the working paper version of this paper, 
Bjørnskov, Dreher and Fischer (2009). 
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literature is that the effect of institutional quality has been investigated in samples which 
pooled rich and poor countries. Arguably, the impact of institutions will likely differ 
among these groups of countries, with institutions providing basic needs (food, shelter, 
health care, education) affecting more countries at lower levels of economic 
development. The effects of political institutions, conversely, are more likely to kick in 
when a majority of the population has escaped material want.4 
In this paper, we therefore re-investigate the impact of institutional quality on two 
measures of happiness using one common framework, namely by holding sample size 
constant, and controlling for a common set of variables. Moreover, we ask the question 
of which type of formal institutional quality matters, which we attempt to answer using 
1) an array of different institutional indicators, and 2) two new, orthogonal indicators 
derived by Principal Components Analysis. Both tests are likely to provide some 
indication as to which broad institutional mechanisms matter for happiness. As an 
additional way of clearing some of the confusion in the literature, we investigate the 
potentially different effects of institutions on happiness for relatively rich and poor 
countries separately. 
We find that the quality of formal institutions is indeed positively associated with 
happiness. Using Principal Components Analysis, the effects only slightly differ with 
respect to how aggregate happiness is defined. The analysis suggests that the effects of 
                                               
4
 Relaxing the implicit assumption in most studies that the effects of institutional quality are homogenous 
across the world sample, Helliwell and Huang (2008) provide a first indication that honest and efficient 
public service provision increases happiness in relatively poor and rich countries, while political 
institutions are positively related to happiness in relatively rich countries only. However, Knack and 
Langbein (2010) demonstrate that the indicators used in Helliwell and Huang (2009) are not 
distinguishable as separate indices. 
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economic-judicial institutions on happiness dominate those of political institutions in 
developing countries. In a sample restricted to middle- and high-income countries, 
however, we find strong support for a beneficial effect of political institutions in 
addition. We conclude that these differences might partly explain the contradictory 
results of previous studies neglecting them. 
We proceed as follows. The next section presents our indicators of institutional 
quality and reports our data and estimation method. Section 3 shows the results while 
the final section concludes and derives policy implications. 
 
2. Data and Methodology 
2.1. Data 
2.1.1. The dependent variable: subjective well-being 
To measure national levels of life satisfaction, we employ two different indicators, 
based both on the survey question ”All things considered, how satisfied are you with 
your life as a whole these days?”, which respondents answer on a ten-point scale. The 
life satisfaction scores employed here are taken from all the five available waves of the 
World Values Survey (WVS, 2009), a repeated cross-section with a growing number of 
participating countries.5  
Our first measure of happiness follows Helliwell (2006) and the approach in the 
World Database of Happiness in using the average national score on the life satisfaction 
question. As an alternative, we rely on the World Values Survey coding in using the 
percentage of the population answering in the top three categories, which arguably 
                                               
5
 First wave: 1981-1984, second wave: 1989-1993, third wave: 1994-1999, fourth wave: 1999-2004, fifth 
wave: 2005. 
 6
makes the measure less sensitive to cultural differences in answering at the extremes of 
the scale (following Bjørnskov, Dreher and Fischer, 2007). While the correlation across 
the two measures is .95, the country rankings do change slightly between these 
measures. With our focus on institutional determinants of happiness, both reverse 
causality and ecological fallacy are not likely to be a problem here. In particular, the 
exclusion of relevant individual-level factors could severely bias our results if their 
inclusion resulted in different country rankings. However, to test for the presence of 
ecological fallacy we calculate the country fixed effects from running a standard 
individual-level ordered probit regression (cf. Bjørnskov, Dreher and Fischer, 2008a), 
obtaining a measure of differences in macro happiness not pertaining to individual-level 
factors. Comparing these country fixed effects estimates with the alternative aggregate 
happiness measures employed in this study suggests that an ecological fallacy is not 
likely to be present: their correlations are .99 (for the simple average happiness) and .92 
(for the top three coding), respectively. 
 The mean of life satisfaction in a country is usually viewed as good overall 
assessment of national happiness, but is clearly more sensitive to respondents in either 
tail of the happiness distribution, namely to very low or high ranges of the life 
satisfaction score, compared to the top-share. On the other hand, using the share of 
respondents answering in the top-three categories mitigates some specific cultural 
differences in response styles that may introduce unnecessary noise when using average 
happiness (cf. Bjørnskov, 2006). We remain agnostic with respect to which measure is 
the more precise, including which measure provides a better solution to the potential 
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cardinality problem (see, e.g., Ng, 1997), since two different types of cultural response 
styles could bias the measures in opposite directions.6 
 
2.1.2. Measures of formal institutions 
To test for the impact of the quality of formal institutions on life satisfaction, we 
employ a set of alternative governance measures: 1) the ‘legal quality’ index from the 
Fraser Institute (Gwartney and Lawson, 2008); 2) the combined Gastil index of civil 
liberties and political rights from Freedom House (2008); 3) the Polity IV index of 
democracy from Marshall and Jaggers (2004); 4)-5) Helliwell’s (2006) two groups of 
variables relating to “the honesty and efficiency of government” and “the operation of 
the democratic process,” which may be viewed as proxy of democratic rights;7 and 6)-
8) three indices from Henisz (2000, 2002), the first measuring the extent of constraints 
                                               
6
 Bjørnskov (2006) argues that the WVS coding is more appropriate if respondents in some countries are 
averse to answering in the top category. However, if respondents are averse to answering far from the 
mean, i.e., averse to both ‘too’ positive and ‘too’ negative answers, resulting in a mean-preserving 
cultural spread, the average measure would be more precise. As we have no way of assessing the relative 
importance of these types of biases, we proceed by tentatively interpreting the measures as if they were 
precise. We nevertheless do note that the average measure may be a more reliable measure in particularly 
poor countries, in which only a small and presumably rich part of the population is likely to respond in 
the top categories. 
7
 These variables derive from Kaufmann et al. (2008), with the first variable being the average of 
government effectiveness, regulatory efficiency, rule of law and lack of corruption, and the second 
variable the average of voice and accountability, and political stability. Helliwell arrives at measures for 
1990 and 1981 by extrapolating the Kaufmann data from 1996 (the earliest observation) into the past 
(personal communication, July 22, 2009). These two highly correlated indices are also used in Helliwell 
and Huang’s (2008) analysis investigating the impact of government quality on happiness. 
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on policy-making by measuring the strength of political veto players, the second adding 
the veto-players in the judiciary and at the sub-federal level, and the third capturing the 
extent of ‘law and order’. Except for the Gastil index, higher values correspond to 
improved institutional quality or more binding institutional constraints. The eight 
institutional measures are summarized in Table 1. 
 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 
Two of our legal institutions indices (‘legal quality’, ‘law and order’) capture the 
protection of property rights. While among the political institutional measures the Gastil 
index measures the protection of political rights and civil liberties more broadly –
capturing also the freedoms of speech and of association – citizens’ political rights in a 
narrow sense are reflected in the Polity IV index. The remaining indices are designed to 
measure either government effectiveness or the degree of discretion in policy-making. 
By testing these indicators against each other we hope to be able to evaluate which 
types of governance are responsible for potential consequences on average national 
happiness. Descriptive statistics of the institutional variables are shown in Table 2 while 
sources are given in the Appendix. 
 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
 
2.1.3. Control variables 
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In choosing our control variables, we take the specification in Helliwell (2006) as our 
starting point and supplement it by additional aggregate variables found to be important 
determinants of well-being in previous work (Bjørnskov, Dreher and Fischer, 2007).  
The set of control variables includes an indicator of social capital: the average 
number of membership in nine different types of voluntary organizations, which in the 
tradition of Putnam (2000) aims to capture social activity and social networks. As 
measure of informal societal institutions we also employ social trust – an indicator of 
honesty and trustworthiness – which is measured by the percentage of respondents 
answering ‘yes’ to the question “In general, do you think most people can be trusted?” 
Since recent studies indicate that the quality of formal institutions is affected by social 
trust, including this measure of informal institutions is arguably important as we would 
otherwise risk overestimating the importance of formal institutions (cf. Knack, 2002). 
Following Helliwell (2006), our baseline specification also includes a measure of how 
strongly people believe in god (expressed by the national percentage answering ‘yes’ to 
the question “Do you believe in a superior being”), which might also be considered as a 
type of informal institution (cf. North, 1990). We also control for the divorce rate and 
the official unemployment rate. Divorce rates have been shown to negatively affect 
happiness (e.g., Helliwell, 2006), and so has the national unemployment rate (e.g., 
DiTella et al. 2001). As the effect of economic development is highly debated in the 
happiness literature, we also include (log) GDP per capita throughout (cf. Easterlin, 
1995). This gives us a maximum sample of 148 pooled country-year observations from 
62 countries potentially observed in either waves, namely in 1981, 1990, 1995, 1999, 
and 2005, for which we have full data. All countries are listed in Appendix Table A2. 
 10
Descriptive statistics of the control variables are shown in Table 2 while sources are 
given in the Appendix. 
 
2.1.4. Baseline model 
The baseline model consists of the institutional quality measure, the social capital 
variable, the two informal institutions measures (‘social trust’ and ‘belief in god’), the 
divorce and unemployment rates, and a measure of national income. In the course of our 
analysis, this baseline model is then supplemented by a set of additional variables. First, 
we include dummies for postcommunist countries, Latin America and Asia, which 
previous research shows to be highly significant (Bjørnskov, Dreher and Fischer, 2007, 
2008a). Second, we add period fixed effects to the model to take care of joint macro 
trends over time, such as business cycles, which also alleviates some effects of the 
changing country composition of our sample across waves. Third, we augment the 
model with openness to trade and the investment price level relative to the U.S., both of 
which are measures of international integration and business prospects; in recent 
studies, these have been found to be robustly positively associated with happiness (e.g., 
Bjørnskov, Dreher and Fischer, 2007, 2008a). As well-working institutions may 
promote trade and growth (prospects) (as, e.g., the institutional reforms in China show), 
omitting these factors from the model would lead to an overestimation of the pure effect 
of institutional quality.8 
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 Bjørnskov, Dreher and Fischer (2008) find additional robust determinants of life satisfaction. However, 
not all are significant at conventional levels in this sample and others are only available for a small 
number of observations. We therefore do not include these variables in the full specification, but note that 
the results reported below remain unchanged if adding the additional variables. 
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2.2. Methodology 
In the following, we estimate the influence of the institutional indicators in this 
unbalanced country-panel dataset as pooled OLS with Beck and Katz’s (1995) panel 
corrected standard errors (PCSE).9 As happiness and institutions change slowly over 
time, inclusion of country fixed effects is not advisable even though our sample spans 
up to 25 years.10  
It may be argued that pooling the data increases the number of observations 
artificially. Furthermore, the unbalanced structure of the data gives some countries 
greater weight in the estimates than others. However, the main results remain when we 
weigh observations giving each country equal weight. They also remain when we use 
the 1999-cross-section only. 
Finally, to test whether the impact of institutions on happiness differs among poor 
and rich countries, we also use reduced samples of rich and poor country observations. 
The rich country-sample consists of all observations with an average GDP per capita 
above 10,000 purchasing-power parity adjusted US dollars; this sub-sample includes 96 
                                               
9
 Assuming that disturbances are heteroscedastic, allowing for panel-specific variances in unbalanced 
panels corrects for a bias in the standard errors that may otherwise inflate significance levels. Using PCSE 
thus generates more conservative estimates. 
10
 In an additional set of results, we allow for an estimated first-order autoregressive disturbance, which 
equally corrects otherwise biased standard errors. Given that institutions change slowly over time, even 
with a time gap of 5 years or more across waves the assumption of first-order autocorrelation is justified. 
We do not report these estimates in the following as all results are robust to allowing for autocorrelation; 
however, these results are available on request. The same holds for a set of fixed effects regressions 
which employs an alternative, more volatile measure of national happiness. Although all results are less 
significant in the fixed effects specification, as one would expect in a small sample, these results also 
provide significant support for our main findings. 
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country-year observations from 31 countries. We chose a threshold level of 10,000 USD 
as it is approximately the level at which most studies find average income to cease 
being associated with subjective well-being, excluding roughly one third of all 
observations and countries (Schyns, 1998; Dolan, Peasgood and White, 2008).11 The 
sample containing poor countries only consists of all observations with GDP per capita 
below 20,000 US dollars, thereby making it of the same size as the subsample with rich 
countries, i.e., a sample size that is empirically practicable.12 With both samples, the 
relevant comparison group is therefore the set of middle-income countries. All results 
are reported for both happiness measures using the full sample and the sub-samples of 
rich and poor countries. 
 
3. Results 
As a first simple way of illustrating the potential effects of institutional quality on life 
satisfaction, as well as demonstrating the difficulty in separating institutional measures, 
Table 3 reports the simple and partial correlations (controlling for GDP) between the 
institutional variables as well as their correlations with the two measures of national 
happiness. First of all, the table illustrates the difficulty in separating different 
institutional characteristics, as most indices are highly related. The relative exceptions 
are the Polity IV index and the two political constraints indicators that are more 
                                               
11
 When splitting the sample at what may seem a somewhat arbitrary level of USD 10,000, it should be 
noted that all results remain qualitatively unchanged when we apply other cut-offs of, e.g., USD 9,000 or 
11,000. As such, the subsample results in the following do not depend on the specific cut-off chosen here. 
12
 As we are operating near the limit at which panel estimates make sense, we have had to go for a larger 
sample, which necessitates that we allow for partially overlapping samples. While a clean cut-off would 
be ideally preferable, it is not practicable with these data. 
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moderately correlated with the remaining institutional indices. However, it is worth 
noting that a relatively large share of rich countries scores a perfect 10 on the Polity IV 
index, which is therefore effectively right-censored.13 Second, the partial correlations 
also show that controlling for joint variation due to GDP per capita (which is highly 
correlated with institutional quality) reduces some of the correlations among the 
institutional measures and thus makes it potentially easier to separate the effects of 
single institutional measures on happiness. In other words, part of the identification 
problem seems to lie in economic development confounding relations between 
institutional indices. 
 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
 
The remainder of this section is structured as follows. First, we replicate the results in 
Helliwell (2006) for our two measures of happiness – based on constant samples of 
countries – thereby testing the robustness of previous results to the choice of dependent 
variable. We then add additional control variables to see whether these first results arise 
from omitted variables bias. Second, we employ the different indicators of institutional 
quality introduced above to test which dimension of institutional quality is most 
robustly linked to happiness. Finally, we report the results of Principal Components 
Analysis, deriving two main dimensions of institutional quality, and relating them to 
happiness. 
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 It is also well known that most countries tend to fare better on the Polity IV index of democracy than on 
the alternative Gastil index of political rights and civil liberties or Henisz’s (2000) measures. As 
explained in the previous section, the reason is that the latter two indices apply a broader concept of 
democracy that also entails civil rights (like, e.g., economic freedom). 
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 Column 1 of Table 4 replicates Helliwell’s (2006) results using the ‘honest and 
efficient government’ indicator and his original specification (thus excluding period and 
region dummies) with average national happiness as dependent variable. Column 5 
instead reports the results when the share of respondents in the top three categories is 
employed as dependent variable instead. 
As the estimates in these columns show, in the baseline specification our variable 
of main interest, government efficiency, increases national happiness according to both 
definitions of happiness, with a coefficient significant at the one percent level. As 
regards the control variables, their effects are equally qualitatively identical across the 
two definitions of well-being. Contrasting Helliwell (2006), however, the effects of 
social networks (‘average memberships’) are not robust to using our larger sample. At 
least at the five percent level, and in support of Helliwell (2006), we find that social 
trust, believing in god, and economic development increase average and ‘top three’ 
well-being, while divorce and unemployment rates reduce it. 
The model extensions are reported in columns 2 and 6. They add a dummy for 
postcommunist countries and the regional dummies for Asia and Latin America, period 
dummies, and two variables – trade openness and the investment price level – that are 
arguably correlated with efficient government institutions.14 Columns 3 and 7 exclude 
poor countries from the regression sample while columns 4 and 8 exclude relatively rich 
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 As the tables show, the introduction of regional dummies substantially improves the statistical fit. With 
respect to these variables, it is worth mentioning that people in Latin American countries, in particular, 
are happier than the average. The difference to the rest of the world, all other things held constant, is 
+0.44 points on the average measure and +5.6 percentage points when using the WVS coding. A working 
paper version of this paper (Bjørnskov, Dreher and Fischer, 2009) provides further evidence showing the 
influence of the separate inclusion of regional dummies and additional variables. 
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countries. Again, we hold the samples constant across the table so that the observed 
differences are exclusively due to differences caused by the additional explanatory 
variables included in the model and to how we measure happiness. 
Across our models and the two happiness measures, some minor differences 
emerge for the control variables: According to the results for the average coding 
reported on the lefthand side of the table, membership in voluntary organizations is 
significant at the ten percent level in only relatively poor countries, and only for the 
average measure of happiness. In contrast, the unemployment rate no longer affects 
average happiness according to columns 2-4 but still reduces well-being when focusing 
on the share of happiest in the population.15 While the effects of the divorce rate are 
robust when using the average coding, the coefficient is not significant in any of the 
additional regressions when using the top three coding (columns 6-8). Not surprisingly, 
per capita GDP loses significance when focusing on the top three coding in the more 
homogenous group of rich countries.  
 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
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 We can only speculate on why unemployment becomes insignificant when using the average measure 
of happiness. Possibly, this finding indicates a social norm effect (cf. Clark, Knabe and Raetzel, 2008). 
However, it also seems a priori likely that unemployment mainly moves people out of the bottom of the 
top categories and into a lower category, thus only affecting the happiness average marginally, but 
emerging clearly in the alternative measure. We also note that the effects of unemployment and 
membership are substantially weakened when period fixed effects are added. As such, due to our data 
covering more periods, this effect seems to reflect that these factors tend to follow a joint, international 
business cycle. 
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Turning to our variable of interest – the effects of honest and efficient 
governments – we basically replicate Helliwell’s (2006) main findings when keeping to 
his specification, regardless of how the dependent variable is defined. When using the 
average coding, the result equally remains when adding the extra control variables, 
which is not the case when employing the population share of the happiest people: in 
column 7, institutional quality is significant at the ten percent level only, while it is no 
longer significant at conventional levels in column 8. The decrease in coefficient size of 
the ‘efficient government’ estimates suggests that government efficiency varies 
systematically across world regions, but rather not over time, and that it is associated 
with increased trade openness and positive business prospects, as we conjectured.  
Overall, there hence seems to be some support for the importance of institutional 
quality on happiness when using the average measure of population well-being. The 
results in both tables nevertheless indicate that the simple models of columns 1 and 5 
overestimate the effects of formal institutions. Calculating elasticities, the results show 
that the beta coefficient reduced by more than half when including the additional 
relevant control variables. 
Taken all together, in the extended models, quality of both formal and informal 
institutional quality still appears to be conducive to people’s life satisfaction in rich 
countries. However, while the effects of social trust and belief in god are robust to 
varying model specifications, this is not the case for the effect of ‘honest and efficient 
governments’: it is not robust to the choice of happiness measure, particularly when 
economic covariates are added to the model. Using the average coding, which both 
includes changes away from misery (the bottom of the happiness distribution) as well as 
changes towards actual happiness (the top of the distribution), a one-standard deviation 
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shock to formal institutions induces an improvement in happiness of approximately one 
fourth of a standard deviation while a shock of similar size to trust results in a similar 
improvement in happiness.  
Arguably, a main critique one could direct against the results in Table 4 is that, as 
various measures of governance are strongly correlated and one indicator of institutional 
quality might just proxy for another, they do not inform about which type of formal 
institutions matters. 
To test for the potential importance of the broader number of alternative 
institutional indicators as used in the previous literature and summarized in Table 1, we 
employ the (new) baseline of columns 2 and 5 in the previous table (which includes 
period dummies, regional dummies, and all economic factors), again focusing on the 
same set of country observations. Specifically, we replace the ‘honest and efficient 
government’ indicator by one other institutional index at the time to test which of them 
is most robustly related to well-being. Again, we also report results for subsamples 
restricted to richer and poorer countries. 
Table 5 summarizes the results of testing the strength of the institutional indicators 
against each other. For all eight indices, respectively, one additional index of the seven 
remaining ones was added at the time to the regressions. Table 5 then reports the 
number of instances out of seven in which the index remains significant at conventional 
levels of significance. As such, the results can indicate the relative strength of each 
institutional indicator. For both life satisfaction measures, democratic process quite 
clearly dominates in the total sample, always being significant at the five percent level 
at least. However, quite strong results are also obtained for legal quality and the Gastil 
index. For the rich country sample it is less clear which index dominates as the Political 
 18
Constraints III measure also remains significant at conventional levels in most cases. 
For the poor country sample, legal quality is the most robust measure, with democratic 
process second and all other indicators failing all tests with at least one of the happiness 
measures. 
 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
 
Overall, in Table 5 the evidence on the effects of formal institutions on happiness 
remains mixed and rather inconclusive. First, the fairly robust impact of democratic 
process and legal quality across the two different definitions of happiness and the two 
sample sizes is quite striking. On the other hand, for the richer countries the overall 
picture looks different where both measures of legal quality, the Gastil index of civil 
liberties, the democratic process measure, and Political Constraints III are reasonably 
robust.  
With respect to the Polity IV index, in particular, it must be stressed that there is 
rather little variation in these indices at the top of the global income distribution. As 
such, their profiles tend to follow the pattern of the effects of economic development on 
happiness. In other words, the specific relation between these indices and GDP per 
capita implies that they are relatively likely to pick up the non-linear relation between 
average income and happiness documented in other studies (cf. Schyns, 1998). Seen in 
the light of this feature, the relative strength of the Gastil index may be more remarkable 
as it measures the status of both economic-judicial and political institutions, resulting in 
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much larger variation compared to the more narrowly defined Polity IV democracy 
measure.16 
 As the results in Table 5 suggest, it is difficult to separate the effects of different 
indices of formal institutions on happiness since they are highly correlated – as shown 
in Table 3 – and strongly related to economic development (cf. Paldam and Gundlach, 
in press). As recent evidence suggests that many governance indices may measure the 
same underlying construct (c.f., Knack and Langbein, 2010), we therefore perform the 
following simple three-step test in addition to the standard analysis: 1) we first follow 
Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) in calculating the residuals of regressing the eight 
indicators on (log) GDP per capita, thereby taking out most joint variation due to 
economic development, and leaving only variation that is strictly institutional instead of 
following from economic capacity (see also Hicken, Satyanath and Sergenti, 2005); 2) 
we use these residuals as if they were precise measures of institutions in a principal 
components analysis (Table A3 in the Appendix reports the specifics of this analysis); 
and 3) we rerun the analyses above using the component solution of the analysis. As 
such, this procedure has the double advantage that most variation caused by economic 
development is excluded from the resulting indices, and that these indices are 
orthogonal by construction. Problems due to joint variation hidden in most indices of 
institutional quality that would prevent identification of differential effects of different 
types of institutions are thus alleviated. 
                                               
16
 Indeed, splitting the Gastil index in political rights and civil liberties shows that the variation of the full 
index across the richer countries is driven by civil liberties, mirroring the invariance of the more narrowly 
defined Polity IV index. 
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First of all, the principal components analysis supports the existence of two 
orthogonal components that can be readily interpreted as a political institutions 
component and a component capturing the quality of economic and judicial institutions 
(see Table A3), corroborating the differential findings of Table 5. As such, the results 
are broadly consistent with the similar analysis in Munck and Verkuilen (2002) who 
find two broadly similar institutional dimensions.  
Using these two scores – which we term ‘political factor’ and ‘economic factor’ – 
in place of the primary indices therefore should provide more precise estimates on the 
importance of the two separate institutional types for happiness compared to the 
analyses above. As Table 6 quite clearly shows, this actually is the case. 
 
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
 
The results in Table 6 document a positive effect of economic-judicial and 
political institutions for both measures of life satisfaction, in the full sample and both 
subsamples alike. However, for either measure of life satisfaction, the one of the 
dimensions of institutional quality is clearly stronger when excluding relatively poor 
countries. Our results indicate that whenever countries have reached a certain level of 
economic development, the institutions of democratic political decision-making may be 
beneficial for overall national happiness. In contrast, the development of factors such as 
a fair and efficient legal system affects citizens’ average happiness in poor countries 
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too, but not happiness when coded as the top three percentage.17 The last section 
summarizes and discusses the significance of the full set of findings. 
 
4. Conclusions and policy implications 
What contributes to happiness, and whether national happiness can be altered has 
recently become a key topic in the new literature on happiness within economics. 
However, many empirical findings have been conflicting, not least those pertaining to 
the potential influence of institutional quality. This paper looks closer into the 
association between the quality of formal institutions and national happiness, paying 
specific attention to the differential effects of different types and different indicators of 
institutional quality. Particularly, we have estimated the potential influence of formal 
institutions by applying eight different indicators of institutional quality and governance 
to a constant set of countries. In addition, we have taken account of the strong 
correlation among measures of institutional quality by deriving factor scores, which 
yielded two separate dimensions of good governance capturing economic-judicial 
quality and political influence. Finally, we took account of the differential impact of 
institutional quality on happiness in low as compared to high income countries. 
Overall, when employing the traditional institutional indicators, our results 
support the existence of a positive effect of institutions on average national happiness, 
                                               
17
 It should be stressed that due to the well established association between income and individual 
subjective wellbeing, the top three share is more likely to capture the average happiness of a relative elite 
in particularly poor countries. In contrast, in relatively richer countries, it is likely to be a better measure 
of the happiness of the population at large. To the extent that this holds for most poor countries, we must 
consider the average measure as a more valid measure of happiness within these countries, all other things 
being equal. 
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but also illustrate the difficulty in separating different types and dimensions of 
institutional quality. To resolve this problem, we use two measures of institutional 
quality constructed with factor analysis. We thereby alleviate the problem of 
conceptually and empirically separating different indicators, as outlined by Knack and 
Langbein (2010). This provides some support for the existence of two independent 
effects – that of overall economic-judicial and that of political institutions. The 
economic-judicial type seems to dominate the political institutions type when a 
sufficient number of developing countries enter the sample, while analyses restricted to 
middle- and high-income countries show an additional strong support for a beneficial 
effect of the political institutions type. This finding is in line with Dorn et al. (2007) and 
Helliwell and Huang (2008), both showing that democracy contributes to happiness in 
cross-sections of richer countries.  
Overall, our factor score analysis indicates a robust and positive association 
between the quality of formal economic-judicial and political institutions, and national 
happiness. The size of these effects, measured as the change induced in happiness from 
a one-standard deviation change in institutional quality, vary between one sixth and one 
third of a standard deviation. Using the average measure of happiness, marginal effects 
are substantially larger for the subsample of richer countries than for comparatively 
poor countries, and are therefore of economic and social significance.  
However, following the traditional happiness literature (e.g., Helliwell 2003), we 
do not estimate the unconditional effects of institutions, but confine the analysis to 
partial effects, controlling for some of the potential transmission channels – most 
notably economic well-being and trade. While economic transmission channels are 
comparably easy to account for, with an international country panel like ours there are 
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no consistent measures of government activities, procedural utility or even 
‘entertainment through politics’. This leaves us with the still unresolved question of 
what the potentially mediating factors may be and a set of relatively conservative 
estimates of the importance of institutions for happiness. 
Another critique one may raise is the rather unresolved question of causality – do 
happy citizens choose democratic structures while the unhappy prefer to be lead by a 
‘strong single man’? Here, we follow the previous literature arguing that the relatively 
larger stability of institutions over time compared to the more volatile happiness 
measure makes reversed causality unlikely (e.g., Frey and Stutzer 2000, Dorn et al. 
2008). Moreover, we found the effects of the institutional factor scores to be robust in a 
fixed effects framework that controls for unobserved heterogeneity across countries, 
thus mitigating potential biases trough endogeneity and omitted variables.  
Our results suggest that citizens may derive subjective well-being from having 
democratic political institutions whenever the bulk of the population has escaped real 
(absolute) poverty. Yet, before that goal has been reached, only economic-judicial 
institutions protecting life, ensuring property rights and providing economic 
opportunities contribute to average happiness. This type of institutions may 
simultaneously also fuel economic growth (cf. Knack and Keefer, 1995; Berggren, 
2003; Engerman and Sokoloff, 2008). From a methodological point of view, our 
empirical findings suggest that part of the controversy in the literature may simply stem 
from the systematic parameter heterogeneity of the institutional estimates that may have 
biased full-sample estimates towards zero in most large-sample studies. In other words, 
at a basic level, the results suggest that institutions protecting life and property – the 
economic-judicial institutions – are associated with happiness at most levels of 
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development. Political institutions are more likely to be related to valuing influence and 
being able to express ones opinion freely. 
Whether our findings hold any policy implications or not is the final question to be 
touched upon. We explicitly do not discuss whether governments should attempt to 
follow such implications – a question which Frey and Stutzer (2000b) address at length 
– but only whether the findings hold potential implications. 
First, the results indicate that the strength of legal quality is associated with 
happiness. One of the potential ways to raise national happiness would thus seem to be 
to invest in a fair and efficient legal system and to allow for economic opportunities in 
poor and rich countries alike, as indicated by Ovaska and Takashima (2006). An 
additional side-benefit of such an approach would also be higher economic growth as 
suggested by the vast literature on the topic. However, the everlasting problem remains 
how to implement a fair and efficient legal system in which citizens can have 
confidence. 
Second, our findings suggest that democratization would in general be beneficial 
for national happiness when countries have reached a certain level of economic 
development at which most basic needs are met for the majority of the population. 
Indeed, the democracy literature suggests that democratization becomes more likely 
when countries surpass some level of economic development (Lipset, 1959; Paldam, 
2007). That might imply that we should not expect a beneficial effect of attempts by the 
international community to impose democracy from the outside in poor, disorganized, 
and socially unstable countries. The results of the literature on development aid but also 
the current ‘failures’ in Iraq and Afghanistan show that such efforts have been at best 
ineffective (e.g., Knack, 2004).  
 25
At the end of the day, we are therefore left with a set of findings that entail rather 
difficult implications. Fair and efficient judicial systems seem to contribute to both 
happiness and economic development, but the literature also suggests that institutional 
quality cannot simply be transplanted or copied from other countries. For middle and 
high-income countries, this paper shows that the existence of democratic political 
institutions is also positively associated with happiness. The restriction of the effect of 
such institutions in richer countries, fortunately, represents only a minor problem, as 
most studies find that democracy tends to emerge when countries reach a certain level 
of economic development, and citizens begin to demand political influence (Lipset, 
1959; Paldam, 2007).  
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Table 1. Institutional measures 
Name Source Description 
Legal quality Fraser 
Institute 
(Gwartney 
and Lawson, 
2008) 
Overall measure of the quality and capacity of the legal system, 
consisting of indices of judicial independence, impartiality of the 
courts, protection of intellectual property rights, military 
interference in law and politics, and integrity of the legal system. 
Gastil index Freedom 
House 
(2008) 
Index capturing the existence of political rights and civil liberties; 
lower scores mean better protection of rights and liberties. 
Polity IV index Marshall and 
Jaggers 
(2004) 
Index intended to capture three essential elements of democracy: 1) 
institutions and procedures enabling citizens to freely express their 
preferences for policies and leaders; 2) effective constraints on the 
exercise of power by the executive; and 3) the civil liberties of 
citizens to participate in the political process. 
Honest and 
efficient gov. 
Helliwell 
(2006) 
Average of rule of law, regulatory quality, bureaucratic efficiency 
and control of corruption indices from Kaufmann et al. (2003). 
Democratic 
process 
Helliwell 
(2006) 
Average of political stability and voice and accountability indices 
from Kaufmann et al. (2003). 
Political 
constraints III 
Henisz 
(2000, 2002) 
Index capturing constraints on the feasibility of policy change, 
defined as the degree to which a change in the preferences of one or 
more political actors is permitted to affect government policy. The 
index effectively measures the number and strength of political veto 
points. 
Political 
constraints V 
Henisz 
(2000, 2002) 
Index employing the same data and logic as Political constraints III, 
but adding veto points within the judiciary and sub-federal entities. 
Law and order Henisz 
(2000, 2002) 
Law and Order index from Political Risk Services (1996). Higher 
scores imply “a strong law and order tradition;” lower score mean “a 
tradition of depending on physical force or illegal means to setting 
claims.” 
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics 
 Mean Standard deviation Observations 
Life satisfaction, average 6.989 .956 149 
Life satisfaction, top three 48.942 17.599 149 
Average memberships .429 .313 149 
Social trust .316 .152 149 
Belief in god .417 .267 149 
Divorce rate 1.832 1.112 149 
Unemployment rate 8.352 4.669 149 
Postcommunist .228 .421 149 
Openness to trade 74.936 47.680 149 
Investment price level 83.601 30.392 149 
GDP per capita 16,607 8,527 149 
   149 
Legal quality 7.005 1.571 149 
Gastil index 1.985 1.287 149 
Polity IV index 7.763 4.041 149 
Honest and efficient government .928 .892 149 
Democratic process .789 .679 149 
Political contraints III .442 .142 149 
Political contraints V .698 .187 149 
Law and order 4.752 1.204 149 
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Table 3. Correlations between life satisfaction and institutional measures 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1. Honest and efficient 
government 
1 .91 
(.73) 
.84 
(.56) 
-.69 
(-.21) 
.50 
(.01) 
.34 
(.18) 
.56 
(.31) 
.76 
(.49) 
2. Democratic process  1 .81 
(.49) 
-.76 
(-.39) 
.58 
(.21) 
.40 
(.30) 
.58 
(.33) 
.73 
(.42) 
3. Legal quality   1 -.64 
(-.09) 
.42 
(-.04) 
.32 
(.16) 
.59 
(.39) 
.76 
(.52) 
4. Gastil index    1 -.91 
(-.86) 
-.47 
(-.39) 
-.57 
(-.35) 
-.56 
(-.13) 
5. Polity IV index     1 .48 
(.39) 
.51 
(.31) 
.39 
(.00) 
6. Political constraints 
III 
     1 .53 
(.46) 
.27 
(.11) 
7. Political constraints V       1 .65 
(.48) 
8. Law and order        1 
         
Average happiness .66 .56 .53 -.48 .35 .21 .29 .39 
Top three happiness .65 .57 .53 -.49 .39 .23 .28 .41 
Note: partial correlations in parentheses, controlling for GDP per capita. 
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Table 4. Basic results 
 Average coding Top three coding 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
.229 .248* -.015 .343* 3.336 1.399 -4.211 4.639 Average memberships 
(.155) (.145) (.179) (.191) (3.067) (2.913) (3.923) (3.606) 
2.056*** 1.850*** 1.568*** 2.413*** 44.110*** 44.855*** 41.918*** 56.042*** Social trust 
(382) (.358) (.382) (.617) (7.707) (7.324) (8.495) (12.305) 
1.751*** 1.014*** .867*** 1.444*** 31.035*** 17.329*** 13.539** 28.563*** Belief in god 
(.229) (.254) (.239) (.334) (4.481) (4.798) (5.349) (6.040) 
-.242*** 
-.126*** -.114** -.133** -2.646*** -.747 -.118 -.835 Divorce rate 
(.049) (.042) (.053) (.053) (.921) (.769) (1.101) (.857) 
-.022** -.011 -.004 -.011 -.454** -.388** 
-.502* -.393* Unemployment rate 
(.009) (.009) (.012) (.010) (.196) (.183) (.278) (.206) 
Log GDP per capita .425*** .380** .482** .625*** 6.859** 6.312** 5.972 12.382*** 
 (.137) (.153) (.218) (.177) (2.664) (2.929) (5.294) (3.311) 
 -.502** -.272 -.368  -9.689** -8.083 -6.425 Postcommunist 
 (.206) (.271) (.232)  (3.842) (5.776) (4.458) 
Openness to trade  .002** .002** .004**  .061*** .062*** .077*** 
 
 (.001) (.001) (.001)  (.018) (.020) (.023) 
.005***  .089*** .089*** .105*** Investment price level  .004*** 
(.001) 
.004* 
(.002) (.001) 
 
(.025) (.057) (.030) 
.477*** .265** .342** .229* 7.894*** 3.062 4.697* 1.364 Honest and efficient 
government (.111) (.111) (.151) (.118) (2.137) (2.075) (2.671) (2.075) 
Regional dummies No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Period dummies No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Sample All All GDP>10,000 GDP<20,000 All All GDP>10,000 GDP<20,000 
Observations 148 148 96 96 148 148 96 96 
Countries 62 62 36 54 62 62 36 54 
R squared 
.707 .802 .757 .810 .645 .769 .754 .762 
Wald Chi squared 360.42 613.45 299.75 540.83 392.75 638.78 333.49 521.39 
Note: estimation is with pooled OLS; panel corrected standard errors in parentheses; *** (**) [*] indicates significance at p<.01 (p<.05) [p<.10]. “Average” is the 
country’s mean in life satisfaction while “Top three” is the country’s population share of those reporting in the highest three categories of life satisfaction..  
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Table 5. Which indicators are robust? 
  Average Top three 
  All GDP>10,000 GDP<20,000 All GDP>10,000 GDP<20,000 
Legal quality 6 6 7 5 5 6 
Gastil index 4 7 0 5 6 4 
Polity IV index 1 3 0 5 4 5 
Honest and efficient 
government 
4 3 4 0 0 0 
Democratic process 7 7 6 7 7 4 
Law and order 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Political constraints 
III 
0 5 0 0 6 0 
Political constraints 
V 
0 4 0 0 1 0 
Note: The numbers count the instances in which the indicator remains significant at p<.05 when one other 
indicator is added at the time to the regressions reported in column 5 of tables 4 and 5, respectively. 
“Average” is the country’s mean in life satisfaction, while “Top three” denotes the population share of 
those reporting in the highest three categories of life satisfaction. 
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Table 6. Testing types of institutions 
  Average Top three 
  All GDP>10,000 GDP<20,000 All GDP>10,000 GDP<20,000 
.204*** .279*** .175** 2.468** 3.737*** 1.249 Economic 
factor (.065) (.071) (.071) (1.194) (1.348) (1.275) 
.109** .253*** .055 2.712*** 4.956*** 1.998* Political 
factor (.053) (.073) (.059) (.943) (1.531) (1.089) 
Observations 148 96 96 148 96 96 
Countries 62 36 54 62 36 54 
R squared .815 .814 .817 .787 .794 .773 
Wald chi2 622.08 475.49 537.19 617.19 554.70 483.67 
Note: robust standard errors in parentheses; *** (**) [*] indicates significance at p<.01 (p<.05) [p<.10]; 
all regressions include the baseline variables. “Average” is the country’s mean in life satisfaction, while 
“Top three” denotes the population share of those reporting in the highest three categories of life 
satisfaction. 
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Table A1. Data sources 
Variable Source Measured as 
Life satisfaction, top 
three 
Population percentage 
Life satisfaction, 
average 
1 (low) to 10 (high) 
Average 
memberships 
Population percentage 
Social trust Population percentage 
Belief in god 
World Values Survey (2009) 
Population percentage 
Divorce rate Share of marriages 
Unemployment rate 
World Bank (2007) 
Share of active labor 
force 
Postcommunist  0 (no) / 1(yes) 
Openness to trade Share of GDP 
Investment price 
level 
Investment price level 
relative to US 
investment price level 
GDP per capita 
Penn World Tables, Mark 6.2 (Heston et al., 2006) 
ppp adjusted US 
dollars 
Legal quality The Fraser Institute (Gwartney and Lawson, 2008) 0 (low) to 10 (high) 
Gastil index Freedom House (2008) 1(high) to 7 (low) 
Polity IV index Polity IV (Marshall and Jaggers, 2004) 0 (low) to 10 (high) 
Honest and efficient 
government 
Helliwell (2006) -2.5 to 2.5 
Democratic process Helliwell (2006) -2.5 to 2.5 
Law and order Henisz (2000) 0 to .74 
Polcon III Henisz (2002) 0 to .89 
Polcon V Henisz (2000) 2 to 6 
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Table A2. Countries included in the study 
Albania (1999) Hungary (1990) Russia (1990) 
Argentina (1981) Iceland (1981) Serbia (2005) 
Australia (1981) Indonesia (2005) Singapore (1999) 
Austria (1990) Ireland (1981) Slovak Republic (1999) 
Belgium (1981) Italy (1981) Slovenia (1990) 
Brazil (1990) Japan (1981) South Africa (2005) 
Bulgaria (1990) Jordan (2005) South Korea (1990) 
Canada (1981) Latvia (1990) Spain (1981) 
Chile (1990) Lithuania (1990) Sweden (1981) 
Croatia (1995) Luxembourg (1999) Switzerland (1990) 
Cyprus (2005) Malta (1999) Taiwan (2005) 
Czech Republic (1995) Mexico (1981) Thailand (2005) 
Denmark (1981) Moldova (1999) Trinidad and Tobago (2005) 
Dominican Republic (1995) Morocco (2005) Turkey (2005) 
Egypt (2005) Netherlands (1981) Ukraine (1995) 
El Salvador (1999) New Zealand (1999) United Kingdom (1981) 
Estonia (1990) Norway (1981) United States (1981) 
Finland (1990) Peru (1995) Uruguay (1995) 
France (1981) Poland (1990) Venezuela (1995) 
Germany (1981) Portugal (1990) Vietnam (2005) 
Greece (1999) Romania (1990)  
Note: countries in italics are those with at least one observation with a GDP per capita above 10,000 
USD. Numbers in parentheses are the first year in which the country has an observation. 
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Table A3. Principal components analysis 
Variable Economic factor Political factor Uniqueness 
Honest and efficient government .836 .136 .267 
Democratic process .787 .319 .257 
Legal quality .657 .008 .455 
Gastil index -.289 -.869 .154 
Polity IV .004 .883 .207 
Law and order .514 .019 .530 
Polcon III .187 .387 .571 
Polcon V .371 .277 .411 
Eigenvalue 3.392 1.284  
Variance explained .491 .407  
Note: component loadings have been rotated. 
 
  
 
